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"WHAT I HAVE FEARED MOST HAS NOW COME
TO PASS": BLAKELY, BOOKER, AND THE
FUTURE OF SENTENCING
Katie M. McVoy*
INTRODUCTION
In her dissenting opinion to the Supreme Court's decision in
Blakely v. Washington,' Justice O'Connor echoed her prophetic state-
ments in Apprendi v. New Jersey,2 lamenting the far-reaching and dis-
turbing repercussions of the Court's opinion. "What I have feared
most has now come to pass: Over 20 years of sentencing reform are all
but lost, and tens of thousands of criminal judgments are in jeop-
ardy."3 Blakely is the most important sentencing decision in over fifty
years and in just a few short months has wreaked havoc on sentencing
schemes. 4 Justice O'Connor's words are ringing true in the ears of
trial judges, prosecutors and legislators across the country as they be-
gin to face the practical realities of working within a legal system with
an ever-increasing role for the jury.
While Blakely focused specifically on a guidelines system in the
state of Washington, United States v. Booker has revealed its far-reach-
ing impact on both state and federal systems. Part I of this Note will
address the case law that ultimately led to Blakely and its results, and
Part II will discuss viable sentencing options that remain for legisla-
tures after the Blakely decision. Ultimately, this Note will argue that
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2006; B.A., Philosophy
and Theater, Saint Mary's College, 2003. I would like to extend thanks to all of those
who helped with the writing process of this Note, especially Professor Jimmy Gurul6,
who encouraged me to tackle such a difficult topic and provided invaluable guidance
throughout the entire process.
1 124 S. Ct. 2531, 2550 (2004) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
2 530 U.S. 466, 523-24 (2000) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
3 Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2550 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
4 Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting); see also Josh Jacobson, Blakely v. Washington:
Off the Judicial Richter Scale, BENCH & B. MINN., Sept. 2004, at 24 (arguing that Blakely
has indeed caused great doubt and disturbance on the national and state levels).
5 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005).
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Blakely's treatment of jury power has held unconstitutional any judi-
cial factfinding. Upon close inspection, even indeterminate sentenc-
ing schemes and advisory guidelines schemes may suffer from
constitutional infirmity, while fully mandatory systems are unduly
harsh to defendants. What remain are jury sentencing and real of-
fense systems, and although these schemes pass the test of constitu-
tionality, they suffer from serious practical and economic constraints.
Although this Note concludes that a real offense system based on jury
factfinding is the most constitutionally firm system, the Supreme
Court's recent decisions suggest a return to indeterminate sentencing
and the failed experiment of guideline sentencing. In short, in pass-
ing down the holding in Blakely, the Supreme Court may have caused
more damage than even Justice O'Connor realized.
I. HISTORY'S WARNINGS: BLAKELY AS THE INEVITABLE RESULT
OF PRECEDENT
In 1984, Congress enacted the Sentencing Reform Act.6 In the
years that followed the advent of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines,
states began adopting similar guideline systems. By 2001, more than
twenty-five states had enacted systems with elements of mandatory sen-
tencing and guided judicial discretion. 7 However, starting with its de-
cision in Jones v. United States,8 the United States Supreme Court
began to cast doubt on the constitutionality of guidelines systems
under its interpretations of the Sixth Amendment. That line of deci-
sions culminated with Blakely v. Washington,9 which found unconstitu-
tional a section of the state of Washington's guideline system that
authorized an increase in a defendant's sentence based on judicial
6 Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 18 and 28 U.S.C.).
7 See Barry C. Feld, The Constitutional Tension Between Apprendi and McKeiver:
Sentencing Enhancements Based on Deliquency Convictions and the Quality ofJustice in Juve-
nile Courts, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1111, 1118 n.17 (2003) (quotingJoAN PETERSILIA
& SUSAN TURNER, GUIDELINE-BASED JUSTICE: THE IMPLICATIONS FOR RACIAL MINORITIES
1 (1985)).
By 1985, at least 25 states had enacted determinate sentencing statutes, 10
states had abolished their parole boards, and 35 states had mandatory mini-
mum sentence laws . . . . [Miany states and jurisdictions had established
formal guidelines for sentencing decisions (e.g., prison vs. probation, length
of sentence), for determining supervision levels for parolees and probation-
ers, and for parole release.
JOAN PETERSILIA & SUSAN TURNER, GUIDELINE-BASED JUSTICE: THE IMPLICATIONS FOR
RACIAL MINORITIES 1 (1985).
8 526 U.S. 227 (1999).
9 124 S. Ct. 2531.
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factfinding. That decision tolled the death knell for guideline sen-
tencing. United States v. Booker10 brought the first mourner.
The Supreme Court began its march towards Blakely in 1999,11
when it decided Jones v. United States.12 The defendant in Jones was
convicted of violating the federal carjacking statute, 13 which had three
distinct sections. 14 Depending on resulting bodily injury or death, the
defendant's sentence could increase from fifteen years to life in
prison. The question presented to the Supreme Court was whether
the statute defined three distinct crimes or if each section of the stat-
ute merely named sentencing factors that could increase a defen-
dant's sentence upon conviction. 15 The Court, construing the statute
in such a way so as to avoid serious constitutional problems, found
10 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005).
11 The Court had, of course, previously discussed the jury's role and definitions
of elements of crimes. See McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79 (1986). However,
Jones began the line of cases that formed the jurisprudence allowing, even demand-
ing, the decision in Blakely. For a more comprehensive look at the Court's jurispru-
dence regarding juries and defining the elements of offenses, see Note, The
Unconstitutionality of Determinate Sentencing in Light of the Supreme Court's "Elements "Juris-
prudence, 117 HARv. L. REV. 1236, 1236-49 (2004) (discussing the Court's jurispru-
dence beginning with In Re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970)).
12 526 U.S. 227. Prior to Jones, the Court heard arguments in Almandarez-Torres v.
United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998), considering the constitutionality of a federal depor-
tation statute that allowed for an increase in the statutory maximum of two years if a
judge found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant had been de-
ported subsequent to a criminal conviction. Id. at 226-27 (citing 8 U.S.C.
§ 1326(a)-(b) (2000)). The Court found that prior convictions were sentencing fac-
tors, not elements of the offense, and could be found by a judge using a preponder-
ance of the evidence standard. Id. at 231-35. The Court suggested that a finding
requiring ajury to find all facts regarding an increased sentence would call into ques-
tion the Court's death penalty jurisprudence, which allowed judicial factfinding of
aggravating factors. Id. at 247. However, that jurisprudence was directly overruled in
Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002). See infra notes 34-38 and accompanying text.
13 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (2000).
14 Whoever, with the intent to cause death or serious bodily harm, takes a
motor vehicle that has been transported, shipped, or received in interstate
or foreign commerce from the person or presence of another by force and
violence or by intimidation, or attempts to do so, shall-
(1) be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 15 years, or
both,
(2) if serious bodily injury (as defined in section 1365 of this title) re-
sults, be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 25
years, or both, and
(3) if death results, be fined under this title or imprisoned for any num-
ber of years up to life, or both.
Id.
15 Jones, 526 U.S. at 231-32.
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that the statute in fact created three separate crimes.' 6 In short, the
Court held that the statute would be constitutionally infirm if it al-
lowed a judge to find the sentencing factors that would increase a
sentence from a maximum of fifteen years to life.
The Court included in its language a warning to legislatures
about the constitutional problem of removing the jury from the
factfinding process. "The point is simply that diminishment of the
jury's significance by removing control over facts determining a statu-
tory sentencing range would resonate with the claims of earlier con-
troversies, to raise a genuine Sixth Amendment issue not yet
settled.' 1 7 This language already suggests two key concerns that the
Court continues to return to: the weakened role of the jury in crimi-
nal trials and the questionable constitutional nature of judicial
factfinding. Although Jones raised the first serious doubt as to the va-
lidity of judicially found sentencing factors using a preponderance of
the evidence standard,'8 common usage of the words "statutory sen-
tencing range" prevented serious consideration that Jones would have
any effect on guideline schemes.
In its next term, the Court used the language that would find its
way into Blakely and disrupt the thus far unhindered path of judicial
factfinding during criminal sentencing. In Apprendi v. New Jersey,' 9 a
case that sent thousands of defendants back into courts of appeals, 20
the petitioner pled guilty to two counts of second-degree possession of
a firearm for an unlawful purpose and one count of third-degree un-
lawful possession of an antipersonnel bomb.21 Under New Jersey law,
a second-degree count carried with it a maximum penalty of five to
ten years and a third-degree offense carried with it a maximum pen-
16 Id. at 235 ("Here, on the contrary, the search for comparable examples more
readily suggests that Congress had separate and aggravated offenses in mind when it
employed the scheme of numbered subsections in § 2119.").
17 Id. at 248.
18 "The principle that the jury were the judges of the fact and the judges the
deciders of law was stated as an established principle as early as 1628 by Coke." Id. at
248 n.8.
19 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
20 Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 620 (2002) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
As of May 31, 2002, less than two years after Apprendi was announced, the
United States Courts of Appeals had decided approximately 1,802 criminal
appeals in which defendants challenged their sentences, and in some cases
even their convictions, under Apprendi. These federal appeals are likely only
the tip of the iceberg, as federal criminal prosecutions represent a tiny frac-
tion of the total number of criminal prosecutions nationwide.
Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
21 Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 469-70.
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alty of three to five years. 22 However, the State requested an en-
hanced sentence based on a judicial finding by a preponderance of
the evidence that one count of second-degree possession was commit-
ted with a racially biased purpose.23 The judge found the racially bi-
ased purpose and sentenced the petitioner to twelve years on one
count of second-degree possession. The Supreme Court granted cer-
tiorari on the issue of whether the "finding of bias upon which [Ap-
prendi's] hate crime sentence was based must be proved to a jury
beyond a reasonable doubt."24 The Court found that a jury finding
was required.
Citing language from Jones, the Court held that
"under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the
notice and jury trial guarantees of the Sixth Amendment, any fact (other
than prior conviction) that increases the maximum penalty for a
crime must be charged in an indictment, submitted to a jury, and
proven beyond a reasonable doubt."
25
The Court based its holding, in large part, on its "elements juris-
prudence" reasoning: although a state may define a crime as it sees fit,
if an element labeled a "sentencing factor" in fact increases the pen-
alty that a defendant may face, it is improperly labeled. "IT]he rele-
vant inquiry is one not of form, but of effect-does the required
finding expose the defendant to a greater punishment than that au-
thorized by the jury's guilty verdict?" 26 If the fact does indeed expose
the defendant to greater punishment, judicial factfinding is constitu-
tionally infirm. Those facts need to be submitted to thejury. In short,
the Apprendi Court raised two key issues: first, that "constitutional lim-
its exist to States' authority to define away the facts necessary to consti-
22 Id. at 470.
23 See NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:44-3(e) (West Supp. 1999-2000). The statute states
that a hate crime can lead to an extended sentence if "[t]he defendant in committing
the crime acted with a purpose to intimidate an individual or group of individuals
because of race, color, gender, handicap, religion, sexual orientation or ethnicity."
Id.
24 Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 471. The Court looked at the adequacy of New Jersey's
procedure in addition to the facts of the case to determine that judges were given the
authority to find facts that increased a sentence based on a preponderance of the
evidence standard. Therefore, if the Court found the procedure inadequate, it was
not simply the procedure in this case, but the procedure in all similar cases. See id. at
475.
25 Id. at 476 (emphasis added) (quotingJones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 243
n.6 (1999)).
26 Id. at 494.
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tute a criminal offense," 2 7 and second, "'that a state scheme that
keeps from the jury facts that expos [e] [defendants] to greater or ad-
ditional punishment,' may raise a serious constitutional concern."28
This second key issue provides a direct link to the Court's reason-
ing in Blakely. Writing for the Apprendi majority, Justice Stevens raised
concern over the waning role of the jury.29 His opinion reinforces the
role of jury as factfinder.
The historic link between verdict and judgment and the consistent
limitation on judges' discretion to operate within the limits of the
legal penalties provided highlight the novelty of a legislative scheme
that removes from the jury the determination of a fact that, if
found, exposes the criminal defendant to a penalty exceeding the
maximum he would receive if punished according to the facts re-
flected by the jury verdict alone. 3o
It is the jury verdict that authorizes sentencing, and these words
find their way, nearly verbatim, into Blakely.31 The opinion reinforces
the role of the jury as the lone factfinder with a reference to Black-
stone: "'[T]he truth of every accusation, whether preferred in the shape
of indictment, information, or appeal, should afterwards be con-
firmed by the unanimous suffrage of twelve of [the defendant's]
27 Id. at 471. The Court's discussion of the right to ajury trial included an analy-
sis of United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506 (1995), and In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358
(1970). Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 471. In re Winship, which was the pinnacle case in ele-
ments jurisprudence, guaranteed a jury determination of every element of a crime.
397 U.S. at 361. Gaudin reinforced that guarantee, reminding states that a defendant
is guaranteed ajury determination beyond a reasonable doubt of every element of a
crime. 515 U.S. at 510.
28 Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 486 (alteration in original) (quoting McMillan v. Penn-
sylvania, 479 U.S. 79, 88 (1986)). The first issue-what the state chooses to define as
an element-is the issue that has created the most abundant scholarship. For discus-
sions about the elements jurisprudence of Apprendi and its progeny, see Adam
Thurschwell, After Ring, 15 FED. SENT. R. 1 (2002).
29 We do not suggest that trial practices cannot change in the course of cen-
turies and still remain true to the principles that emerged from the Framers'
fears "that the jury right could be lost not only by gross denial, but by ero-
sion." But practice must at least adhere to the basic principles undergirding
the requirements of trying to ajury all facts necessary to constitute a statu-
tory offense, and proving those facts beyond a reasonable doubt.
Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 483 (quoting Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 247-48
(1999)). The possibility of the jury's role being slowly pulled away by erosion, while
intimately related to elements jurisprudence is, in fact, a separate concern that be-
comes more central in the Blakely decision.
30 Id. at 482-83.
31 Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 2537 (2004).
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equals and neighbours .... "32 Use of this language suggests that it is
not only elements that must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt,
but any accusation that increases the defendant's sentence. 33
In Ring v. Arizona, the Supreme Court extended its thinking to
death penalty cases, requiring that ajury find each necessary aggravat-
ing factor beyond a reasonable doubt.3 4 The petitioner in Ring was
convicted of felony murder, the penalty for which was either life im-
prisonment or death. However, before a death sentence could be is-
sued, the judge was required to find an aggravating factor.35 Using
Apprendi language that the question was one not of form but of effect,
the Court found that Arizona's statute "'authorize[d] a maximum
penalty of death only in a formal sense."' 36 "If a State makes an in-
crease in a defendant's authorized punishment contingent on the
finding of a fact-no matter how the State labels it-it must be found
by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt."37 What constitutes a statutory
maximum is that which is imposed without the finding of additional
facts. Although, statutorily, felony murder carried with it a maximum
sentence of death under Arizona law, because that sentence could not
be imposed without the finding of additional facts, it did not serve as
the "statutory maximum" for Apprendi purposes, but rather as an en-
hanced sentence. This broad reading makes a statutory maximum not
the sentence included in the statute itself, but the maximum allowed
by that statute coupled with exceptions and limitations put forth in
other legislative pronouncements. 38
The final stroke fell in Blakely.39 Blakely pled guilty to second-
degree kidnapping in Washington, a felony that carried with it a possi-
32 Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 477 (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
*343).
33 For discussion of the failure of indeterminate sentencing in the light of Blakely
jurisprudence, see supra notes 90-112 and accompanying text. Justice O'Connor's
dissent predicted this very problem.
34 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
35 Id. at 592 n.1.
36 Id. at 604 (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 541 (O'Connor, J., dissenting)).
37 Id. at 602.
38 See id. at 610 (Scalia, J., concurring).
[T]he fundamental meaning of the jury-trial guarantee of the Sixth Amend-
ment is that all facts essential to imposition of the level of punishment that
the defendant receives-whether the statute calls them elements of the of-
fense, sentencing factors, or MaryJane-must be found by the jury beyond a
reasonable doubt.
Id. (Scalia, J., concurring). It is language of this type that threatens even indetermi-
nate sentencing. See infra notes 90-112 and accompanying text.
39 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004).
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ble sentence of ten years. The Washington sentencing scheme, how-
ever, gave a range of fifty-three months for second-degree kidnapping.
During sentencing, the judge found an aggravating factor and in-
creased the sentence to ninety months.40 On appeal, the Court con-
sidered whether the judge's finding by a preponderance of the
evidence of an aggravating factor that increased the range from fifty-
three months to ninety months violated Apprendi. The Court found
that it did.
Finding that the sections of Washington's sentencing scheme that
would increase a defendant's "sentencing range" based on judicial
factfinding were violative of the Sixth Amendment, the Court rein-
forced the new definition of "statutory maximum" that surfaced in
Ring.41 " [T] he 'statutory maximum' for Apprendi purposes is the max-
imum sentence ajudge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected
in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant."42 Justice Scalia, writing
for the majority, reasoned that if the judge had imposed a ninety-
month sentence without the finding of additional facts, he would have
been reversed. Therefore, the finding of fact was essential to the
length of punishment, in effect making it an element of the crime. 43
But again, it is not simply the elements jurisprudence that troubles the
Court; it is also the waning role of the jury. Not only does giving the
judge factfinding capabilities in the sentencing phase violate a defen-
dant's right to ajury determination of all relevant facts, it also violates
the rights of jurors to be factfinders. 44
The Supreme Court reinforced the long reach of Blakely in the
first case it heard this term. Jointly hearing United States v. Booker and
United States v. Fanfan,45 the Court applied Blakely's Sixth Amendment
jurisprudence to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. Booker was
charged with possession with intent to distribute at least fifty grams of
cocaine, putting him in a sentencing range of 210 to 265 months. At
his sentencing hearing, however, the judge determined by a prepon-
derance of the evidence that he had possessed an additional 566
grams of cocaine, increasing his sentencing range to between 360
40 Id. at 2535.
41 Id. at 2537.
42 Id.
43 Id. at 2538.
44 See id. at 2537 ("When ajudge inflicts punishment that the jury's verdict alone
does not allow, the jury has not found all the facts 'which the law makes essential to
the punishment,' and the judge exceeds his proper authority." (citation omitted)
(quoting 1 JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 87, at 55 (2d ed. 1872))).
45 United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005).
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months and life.46 Fanfan was convicted of conspiracy to distribute at
least 500 grams of cocaine. His sentencing range was increased from
seventy-eight months to a 188-to-235-month range based on judicial
factfinding that held him responsible for an additional 2.5 kilograms
of cocaine and 261.6 grams of crack cocaine. 47 In overturning both
defendants' sentences, the Court held that the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines were not meaningfully different from the Washington
guidelines scheme it overturned in Blakely. "This conclusion rests on
the premise, common to both systems, that the relevant sentencing
rules are mandatory and impose binding requirements on all sentenc-
ing judges."48 Any discussion about distinguishing the federal system
from Washington's ended.
III. FEAR MADE MANIFEST: WHAT CAN SURVIVE THE HOLDING
IN BLAKELY?
As prosecutors, judges and legislatures look to their own sentenc-
ing schemes, there is a recognition that sentencing, as it has been
known in this country for the last twenty years, is a failed experiment.
The constitutional restraints on guideline sentencing requires a sec-
ond look at old sentencing regimes as well as creative thinking about
new sentencing alternatives. Each alternative must first pass the
Blakely test and then withstand the practical considerations of effi-
ciency, accuracy and use of limited judicial resources. Ultimately, no
alternative offers the efficiency of guideline sentencing while meeting
the original goal of a sentencing scheme that treats similarly situated
defendants similarly.
A. Determinate Sentencing
A first alternative is a determinate system that does not include
any additional sentencing factors. Blakely's holding does not suggest
that determinate sentencing schemes are, in and of themselves, un-
constitutional. 49 Despite the constitutional firmness of various deter-
minate sentencing schemes, these kinds of schemes suffer from
practical infirmities.
46 Id. at 746.
47 Id.
48 Id. at 742.
49 Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2540 ("We are not, as the State would have it, 'finding
determinate sentencing schemes unconstitutional.' This case is not about whether
determinate sentencing is constitutional, only about how it can be implemented in a
way that respects the Sixth Amendment." (internal citation omitted)).
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1. Mandatory Systems
There is currently no state that employs an entirely mandatory
sentencing scheme, a scheme in which each offense carries with it a
certain sentence regardless of any mitigating or enhancing factors. In
a strictly mandatory system, the offense itself creates the sentence. For
example, all defendants convicted of aggravated assault receive ten
years, regardless of the circumstances surrounding the crime or the
characteristics of the offender. Constitutionally, this kind of scheme
would not draw successful Sixth Amendment challenges. The only
facts relevant to conviction and sentencing are the elements of the
crime, leaving no room for judicial factfinding. Blakely issues are thus
not raised.
However, on a policy level, mandatory sentencing is not a re-
sponse that either defense attorneys or most legislators would choose.
A preliminary examination of mandatory sentences suggests not only
constitutional firmness but also simple accuracy-defendants who
commit the same crime receive the same punishment. However, this
shallow analysis fails to recognize a more complex problem. Not every
offender who commits a particular crime has the same level of culpa-
bility.50 For example, take two defendants A and B, both of whom
committed a robbery. Defendant A has a long criminal history and
robbed the store for the sole purpose of seeing if he could. Defen-
dant B has never been in trouble with the law and robbed the store to
feed his family who have been suffering since he lost his job. While
defendant B cannot present any affirmative defense based on those
circumstances, his culpability is clearly not the same as defendant A.
The law has long recognized this fact: the character of the defen-
dant and the circumstances of the crime play an important role in
culpability. Traditional discretionary sentencing allowed flexibility to
ensure that laws made sense in the case of any particular defendant.5'
When the discretionary system failed to meet the goal of similar treat-
ment for similarly situated defendants, Congress and state legislatures
responded with a system of guidelines to decrease disparity. 52 A sen-
tencing scheme that fails to take into account these aggravating and
50 Even prosecutors recognize this to be the truth. For a discussion of varying
levels of culpability in the prosecution of crime, see Arnie N. Ely, ProsecutorialDiscretion
as an Ethical Necessity: The Ashcroft Memorandum 's Curtailment of the Prosecutor's Duty to
"Seek Justice, "90 CORNELL L. REv. 237, 268-78 (2004).
51 See Rachel E. Barkow, Recharging the Juy: The Criminal Jury's Constitutional Role
in an Era of Mandatory Sentencing, 152 U. PA. L. REv. 33, 37 (2003).
52 S. REp. No. 98-225, at 37-39, 161-62 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3220, 3220-22, 3244-45.
2005] BLAKELY, BOOKER, AND THE FUTURE OF SENTENCING
mitigating circumstances results in identical sentences for the same
statutory crimes but also results in decidedly unequal treatment for
defendants who are not similarly situated. This kind of sentencing
scheme is simply too harsh. 53 It seems unlikely that the interpretation
of the Sixth Amendment requiring jury factfinding would lead legisla-
tors to overlook the problems of disparity and harshness in a
mandatory system.
In addition, a mandatory system may increase prosecutorial
power and encourage sentencing gamesmanship. 54 Already, ninety-
six percent of cases settle before going to trial.55 With a mandatory
system, a defendant who is facing a particular charge cannot hope for
leniency in sentencing when deciding whether to take a case to trial.
His best hope for a more lenient sentence is a deal with the prosecu-
tion that would reduce the number of charges or their severity. This
kind of plea bargaining can cut the other way as well. "As the Commis-
sion's report and other studies have explained, prosecutors and
judges can and will sometimes evade mandatory sentencing provisions
when they seem unjust."56 So whether it be to encourage plea bar-
gaining or in order for a prosecutor to avoid the harshness of certain
laws, mandatory minimums call out for gamesmanship when it comes
to charging and plea bargaining.
2. Mandatory Minimums
Mandatory minimums, which have not been found to violate
Sixth Amendment jury trial guarantees, may be a response to Blakely.
The same day the Supreme Court decided Ring, it also passed judg-
ment on United States v. Harris.57 Harris was sentenced to a mandatory
minimum of seven years after ajudge found at sentencing that he had
brandished a weapon during a drug offense. 58 The Supreme Court
granted certiorari to determine whether the fact that Harris bran-
dished a firearm was a separate crime or if it was a sentencing factor
53 See Douglas A. Berman, A Common Law for this Age of Federal Sentencing: The
Opportunity and Need for Judicial Lawmaking, 11 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 93, 108 (1999)
(discussing the continued imposition of harsh mandatory sentencing schemes).
54 Blakely v. Washington and the Future of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines- Hearing
Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. (2004) [hereinafter Blakely Hear-
ing] (testimony of Ronald Weich), available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/
hearing.cfm?id=1260.
55 Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Federal Justice Statistics, at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/fed.htm (last modified Jan. 27, 2005).
56 Berman, supra note 53, at 99.
57 536 U.S. 545 (2002).
58 Id. at 550.
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that could be found by the judge. Upholding the finding in McMillan
v. Pennsylvania,59 Harris held that the facts that create a mandatory
minimum, so long as they do not extend a defendant's sentence be-
yond the statutory maximum, need not be submitted to a jury and
found beyond a reasonable doubt.60 In Blakely, the Court only dis-
cusses those facts that increase the defendant's sentence beyond the
statutory maximum. What is clearly absent from the Court's opinion
is any mention of facts that would raise the statutory minimum, the
exact purpose mandatory minimums serve. Therefore, so long as the
mandatory minimum does not extend the defendant's sentence be-
yond its statutory length, Harris remains good law and a defendant
can be given a mandatory minimum sentence based on judicially
found facts. 6 1
However, this view of mandatory minimums is inconsistent with
the fear about judicial infringement on the role of juries. Although
there are those who claim that the only role of a jury is to protect a
defendant from sentences above the statutory maximum, 62 the jury's
role as factfinder does not stop at facts essential to statutory maxi-
mums. As the dissenters in Harris pointed out, Apprendi's reasoning
should apply to any fact that changes the range of punishment, in-
cluding mandatory minimums.63 There is an inherent inconsistency
in finding that the Sixth Amendment requires the jury to find facts
relevant to the statutory maximum but denies them the right to find
facts that decrease a defendant's ability to serve a shorter sentence. 64
However, a system of mandatory minimums is inherently inconsis-
tent with the goals of guideline sentencing. As Senator Orrin Hatch
observed:
[T]he general approaches of the two systems are inconsistent.
Whereas the guidelines permit a degree of individualization in de-
termining the appropriate sentence, mandatory minimums employ
a relatively narrow approach under which the same sentence may be
mandated for widely divergent cases. Whereas the guidelines pro-
59 477 U.S. 79 (1986).
60 Harris, 536 U.S. at 557.
61 However, it is important to recall the definition of statutory maximum: the
maximum sentence that can be imposed based on the facts found by the jury alone.
A mandatory minimum that would extend a defendant's sentence beyond a
mandatory guidelines range would exceed the statutory maximum as defined by
Blakely. Therefore, facts triggering statutory minimums exceeding guidelines ranges
would need to be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.
62 Note, supra note 11, at 1246.
63 Harris, 536 U.S. at 574 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
64 See Barkow, supra note 51, at 106 (discussing the danger of allowing juries to
only find the facts relevant to statutory maximums but not minimums).
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vide for graduated increases in sentence severity for additional
wrongdoing or for prior convictions, mandatory minimums often
result in sharp variations in sentences based on what are often only
minimal differences in criminal conduct or prior record. Finally,
whereas the guidelines incorporate a "real offense" approach to sen-
tencing, mandatory minimums are basically a "charge-specific" ap-
proach wherein the sentence is triggered only if the prosecutor
chooses to charge the defendant with a certain offense or to allege
certain facts.
65
Hatch's commentary raises three important points regarding the
failure of mandatory minimums. First, mandatory minimums are not
individual to different defendants in different circumstances. They
suffer from the same infirmities as a strictly mandatory system in that
they fail to account for the fact that defendants committing the same
crime may have differing levels of accountability. Second, mandatory
minimums, while failing to take into account varying levels of culpabil-
ity, overemphasize criminal history. Minimal differences in criminal
history can trigger a mandatory minimum and treat very similar de-
fendants quite differently. Finally, the charge-specific nature of
mandatory minimums can result in the kind of prosecutorial games-
manship that results from any kind of mandatory system.
However, since Blakely there has been considerable talk in Con-
gress and in academic circles that the destruction of the Federal Sen-
tencing Guidelines may bring about an increase in mandatory
minimums for certain crimes. 66 If the Supreme Court sees fit to limit
legislative intervention into sentencing through guidelines, it is possi-
ble that legislatures will try to assert their influence through the use of
mandatory minimums. There is nothing to suggest that some legisla-
tors, who are already concerned about judges providing sentences
that are too lenient even within sentencing systems, will rest easy with
the destruction of such a system or encourage a return to discretion-
ary sentencing.
67
65 Orrin G. Hatch, The Role of Congress in Sentencing: The United States Sentencing
Commission, Mandatory Minimum Sentences, and the Search for a Certain and Effective Sen-
tencing System, 28 WAKE FOREST L. Rrv. 185, 194-95 (1993).
66 SeeJason Hernandez, Blakely's Potential, 38 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 19, 36
n.66 (2004) (suggesting that mandatory minimums may be a congressional response).
67 See, e.g., 149 CONG. REc. H2423 (daily ed. Mar. 27, 2003) (statement of Rep.
Feeney) ("Unfortunately, judges in our country all too often are arbitrarily deviating
from the sentencing guidelines enacted by the United States Congress based on their
personal biases and prejudices, resulting in wide disparity in sentencing."). Com-
ments such as these by Representative Feeney highlight Congress's unease about leav-
ing sentencing in the hands of judges.
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But mandatory minimums fail as a matter of policy. Despite the
ever-increasing use of mandatory minimums, some members of the
legislature, academia and the Supreme Court itself have begun to at-
tack the practice. For example, during its ninety-first legislative ses-
sion, the legislature of the state of Michigan voted to overturn the
state's mandatory minimum laws.68 In a recent address to the Ameri-
can Bar Association (ABA), Justice Kennedy berated the wisdom of a
system of mandatory minimums. "By contrast to the guidelines, I can
accept neither the necessity nor the wisdom of federal mandatory
minimum sentences. In too many cases, mandatory minimum
sentences are unwise and unjust."69 The ABA has joined Justice Ken-
nedy in his disapproval of mandatory minimums, calling for an end to
such sentencing schemes.7 0 Mandatory minimums, called by some
the "sledgehammers of sentencing," lay down a base level for certain
crimes regardless of the circumstances. 7 1 These cliffs of sentencing
compromise ideas of proportionality and culpability.7 2 Whereas
guideline sentencing has touted ideals of sentencing that matches cul-
pability, mandatory minimums, most often based on drug amounts,
do little to take into consideration the varied culpabilities and situa-
tions of defendants convicted of similar crimes. The overturning of
guideline systems, while calling for some legislative response, does not
call for an increase in harsh sentences which result in unequal treat-
ment of defendants.
3. Downward Departures
As a response to the harshness of mandatory systems, the legisla-
ture could consider a modified mandatory system: one that starts with
a base sentence and then allows for downward departures based on
mitigating factors. This kind of system would be constitutional under
Blakely. The dicta in Apprendi stated that a judge is authorized to look
at mitigating factors not found by the jury to decrease a defendant's
68 Bill McConico, Mandatory Minimums: Drug Sentencing Gets an Overhaul MICH.
B.J., Nov. 2003, at 44.
69 Associate Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, Speech at the American Bar Associa-
tion Annual Meeting (Aug. 9, 2003), available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/
publicinfo/speeches/sp_08-09-03.html.
70 STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE ON SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES AND PROCE-
DURES 18-3.21(b) ("A legislature should not proscribe a minimum term of imprison-
ment for any crime.").
71 Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial 117 HARv. L. REV.
2463, 2483 (2004).
72 John S. Martin, Jr., Why Mandatory Minimums Make No Sense, 18 NOTRE DAME
J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 311, 314 (2004).
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sentence.73 This language suggests that the power of 
the jury rests in
the determination of a statutory maximum and does not 
stretch to the
area of minimum sentences. Although factfinding 
is the jury's prov-
ince, the Apprendi dicta limits this reservation of factfinding 
power to
facts that would increase a defendant's sentence, not 
those that would
reduce it. United States v. Ameline champions this view, 
where mitigat-
ing factors can be found by a judge but enhancing factors must 
be
submitted to a jury and found beyond a reasonable doubt.
7 4 In argu-
ing for the severability of the sentencing guidelines, 
the Ameline court
found no violation of the Sixth Amendment right to 
a jury trial when
a defendant submitted and a judge found facts that would reduce 
a
defendant's sentence.
7 5
However, downward departures without enhancements 
do not
meet the goals of sentencing: to ensure sentences 
are equitable be-
tween defendants and to ensure sentences are adequate 
to fit the
crime. 76 Instead, downward departures without corresponding 
en-
hancements create a "one-way street" from which 
defendants would
benefit, but society as a whole would suffer. "Essentially 
the defendant
would be arguing 'what's mine is mine, 
what's yours is negotiable."'
7 7
Arguments made by courts, such as the Ameline court, 
which try to
prove that congressional intent would be served by 
requiring jury de-
termination of aggravating factors but not for downward departures,
are simply unpersuasive.
78 Because guideline systems served as a re-
73 Apprendi v. NewJersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 n.1
6 (2000).
If the defendant can escape the statutory maximum by showing, 
for exam-
ple, that he is a war veteran, then a judge that finds the fact of veteran status
is neither exposing the defendant to a deprivation of liberty 
greater than
that authorized by the verdict according to statute, nor is 
the judge imposing
upon a defendant a greater stigma than the accompanying verdict 
alone.
Id.
74 376 F.3d 967, 981-82 (9th Cir. 2004). But see United States v. Mueffelman, 
327
F. Supp. 2d 79 (D. Mass. 2004) (holding that unconstitutional segments 
were not
severable from Federal Sentencing Guidelines because congressional 
intent would be
thwarted by a severed system).
75 Ameline, 376 F.3d 967; see also United. States v. Swan, 
327 F. Supp. 2d 1068 (D.
Neb. 2004) (allowing for a downward departure where the defendant's 
criminal his-
tory score overrepresented the seriousness of his crime but 
refusing to allow judicially
found enhancements).
76 See S. REP. No. 98-225, at 37-39, 161-62 (1983), reprinted in 1984 
U.S.C.C.A.N.
3220, 3220-22, 3244-45.
77 United States v. Croxford, 324 F. Supp. 2d 1230, 1245 
(D. Utah 2004).
78 Ameline, 376 F.3d at 981-82.
Although severance would change how those facts are determined, 
and by
whom, severance would have no effect on the Congressional 
goal of achiev-
ing consistency of sentences in cases that involve similar offense 
conduct. In
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
sponse to perceived increases in crime, raising the bar for prosecution
but keeping the bar consistent for the defense would obviously under-
mine intent to provide sentences that fit the crime. However clearly
within the dictates of Blakely this kind of regime would fall, its practi-
cal failures make it simply unworkable.
B. Sentencing Guidelines-Literally
Justice Breyer, in his majority opinion in United States v. Booker,
offered a solution to the problem of Blakely by instituting advisory
guidelines. The second part of the Supreme Court's most recent deci-
sion regarding guidelines and Blakely held that severing 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(b) (1), which makes the guidelines mandatory, would result in
a constitutional advisory guidelines system. This kind of system "re-
quires a sentencing court to consider the Guidelines ranges.., but it
permits the court to tailor the sentence in light of other statutory con-
cerns as well."' 79 The opinion argued that congressional intent would
be upheld with this kind of an advisory system.80
Prior to this decision, Utah, Maryland, Delaware, Virginia, Arkan-
sas and Missouri had all adopted guideline systems that are explicitly
"voluntary" and not subject to appeal.8' For example, Missouri code
section 558.019, which creates a Missouri sentencing commission, ex-
plicitly states the voluntary nature of any guidelines promulgated by
that body: "Courts shall retain discretion to lower or exceed the sen-
tence recommended by the commission as otherwise allowable by law,
and to order restorative justice methods, when applicable."8 2 Simi-
larly, Arkansas's sentencing scheme explicitly states in its purpose the
voluntary nature of the guidelines: "Though voluntary, the purpose of
establishing rational and consistent sentencing standards is to seek to
ensure that sanctions imposed following conviction are proportional
to the seriousness of the offense of conviction and to the extent of the
offender's criminal history. 83 When determining a sentence, the sen-
tencing judge uses a system of calculations to determine the "pre-
fact, were we to hold that Blakely precludes application of the Guidelines as a
whole, we would do far greater violence to Congress' intent than if we
merely excised the unconstitutional procedural requirements.
Id.
79 United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738, 757 (2005).
80 Id.
81 Richard S. Frase, Is Guided Discretion Sufficient? Overview of State Sentencing Guide-
lines, 44 ST. Louis U. L.J. 425, 428 (2000).
82 Id.
83 ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-90-801 (b) (1) (Lexis Supp. 2003).
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sumptive sentence." 84 However, the statutorily prescribed maximum
and minimum retain precedence over the presumptive sentence and
the judge retains discretion to sentence within the range prescribed
by statute.85 The other states and Washington, D.C., contain similar
provisions for sentencing.
A guidelines system that is not mandatory would not suffer from
the same infirmities that the Washington system in Blakely did. In the
case of a literal guideline sentencing scheme, the statutory maximum
and minimum are those described in the statute defining the
offense.8 6
As a policy matter, actual guideline sentencing brings with it sev-
eral positives. It would keep intact the original goals of the Sentenc-
ing Reform Act and similar reforms in the states-namely, uniformity
in sentencing similarly situated defendants. 8 7 In addition, it would
provide some consistency forjudges who have come to feel more com-
fortable sentencing defendants based on a committee's determination
of societal beliefs regarding sentencing and statistical analysis.88 How-
ever, there are internal oddities with a sentence that uses advisory
guidelines. Although judges may, in almost all circumstances, rely on
a set of guidelines, if the system were based on an underlying indeter-
minate sentence, there would likely be no right of appeal if the
"guidelines" in their strictest sense were not applied properly. In fact,
guideline sentencing, in a true sense, would not ever require proper
application. 89 Without a right of appeal, what results is not actually a
guidelines system, but a simply indeterminate system with some sug-
gested rules that federal judges may or may not follow. Federal
84 Id. § 16-90-803(a)(2) (A).
85 Id. § 16-90-803(b)(3)(A)(i)(c).
86 See United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738, 756 (2005).
87 S. REP. No. 98-225, at 37-39, 161-62 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3220, 3220-22, 3244-45.
88 See, e.g., Jim Felman, An Interview with Sol Wachtler: A Former Judge Speaks Out
About the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, FED. LAw., May 1999, at 40, 46 (stating that many
judges take comfort in the use of sentencing guidelines, especially those appointed
after the guidelines were instituted).
89 See Blakely Hearing, supra note 54 (testimony of Ronald Weich) (claiming that
a system that views guidelines as guidelines would need to include some kind of right
to appeal the sentence, unlike indeterminate regimes where the judge's sentence, so
long as it is within the statutory range, is virtually unappealable). Any kind of right to
appeal that would be included in a guideline system, in its true sense, would contra-
dict the nature of the guideline as discretionary. If a judge is required to implement
the guideline unless he has some finding of fact that nakes a defendant's case ex-
traordinary, there is no difference from the current guideline schemes, which provide
for exactly that kind of departure.
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judges, many of whom were dissatisfied with both the reduction injudicial discretion and the difficult computation of sentences using
the guidelines, are unlikely to embrace the difficult task of computing
guideline ranges when these ranges are merely suggested, not re-
quired. In addition, an advisory scheme would not give defendants
notice of the likely sentence they will receive; while they may be rely-
ing on the guidelines, ajudge could, without notice, decide not to use
the guidelines and sentence the defendant to something entirely
different.
The biggest obstacle, however, for a guideline system is that the
underlying system to which it gives guidance must also pass the Blakely
test. An advisory guideline system still allows a judge, not a jury, to
determine the facts relevant to sentencing. As discussed in Part II.D
below, indeterminate sentencing, which would be the most logical
choice for a system underlying guideline sentencing, is in tension with
the holdings in both Blakely and Booker. Without a constitutionally
firm underlying sentencing scheme, advisory guidelines cannot serve.
C. Indeterminate Sentencing: Still Not Passing the Test
In his opinion for the Blakely majority, Justice Scalia discussed in-
determinate sentencing, suggesting that it may be the answer for legis-
latures looking at new sentencing schemes. In Apprendi, Blakely, and
Booker, the Court stated that it found no conflict between indetermi-
nate sentencing-allowing judges to take into account offense and of-
fender characteristics-and the Sixth Amendment. 90 So long as a
judge's discretion is qualified by legislative determination of
mandatory minimums and maximums, there was no conflict with the
right to a jury trial.91 However, careful analysis of the Court's lan-
guage uncovers a tension between indeterminate sentencing with judi-
cial factfinding and the Sixth Amendment.92
90 Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 750 ("For when a trial judge exercises his discretion to
select a specific sentence within a defined range, the defendant has no right to ajury
trial determination of the facts that the judge deems relevant."); United States v.
Blakely, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 2540 (2004) (holding that indeterminate sentencing "in-
creases judicial discretion, to be sure, but not at the expense of the jury's traditional
function of finding the facts essential to lawful imposition of the penalty"); Apprendi
v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 481 (2000) ("We should be clear that nothing in this
history suggests that it is impermissible for judges to exercise discretion-taking into
consideration various factors relating both to offense and offender-in imposing
judgment within the range prescribed by statute.").
91 Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 481.
92 Apprendi undertakes a thorough discussion of the historical development of
sentencing. Previously, all criminal proceedings were submitted to a jury that found
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A footnote in the Apprendi decision raised for the first time consti-
tutional doubt about judicial factfinding even in indeterminate sys-
tems. There the Court writes: "The judge's role in sentencing is
constrained at its outer limits by the facts alleged in the indictment
and found by the jury. '93 As stated in Blakely, "Apprendi carries out
this design by ensuring that the judge's authority to sentence derives
wholly from the jury's verdict."'94 This sentiment implies that the
judge's role is to implement the verdict of the jury. The judge, who is
restrained by the jury verdict, is not allowed, even in indeterminate
sentencing schemes, to consider facts that were not found by the jury
in coming to its conclusion.
Justice Scalia's opinion makes the claim that indeterminate sen-
tencing that allows judicial factfinding would not fail a Sixth Amend-
ment challenge. What Justice Scalia argues is different in
indeterminate sentencing than in a determinate system such as the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines. Under indeterminate sentencing, ju-
dicial factfinding does not infringe on a defendant's right to a lower
sentence.95 Whereas a determinate sentencing scheme guarantees a
defendant a right to a particular sentence, indeterminate sentencing
allows judicial factfinding that does not affect the defendant's right to
a sentence, which is set out in the statutory charge itself. As the Court
stated in Booker, consideration of information about the defendant's
character and the facts of the crime do not result in punishment for
any crime other than the one the defendant commited. 96 However,
this argument is inconsistent with Justice Scalia's discussion of the role
of the jury. Because the Sixth Amendment is a reservation of jury
power,97 that power should remain with the jury regardless of what
the legislature determines is the sentence to a crime. If, as Blakely
suggests, it is the province of the jury to determine the facts, that
power resides with the jury for any fact necessary to the sentence, even
if those facts are part of an indeterminate scheme. Even if these facts
do not result in changing the crime the defendant committed, they
all the facts and circumstances constituting the offense. The facts found by the jury
were so specific that there was no doubt which sentencing judgment was to be given.
"'[T] he court must pronounce that judgment, which the law hath annexed to the crime."' Id.
at 479 (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *369-70). At common law,
judges had very little discretion. The judgment, although pronounced by the judge,
was not determined by the judge; it was determined by law. Id. at 480.
93 Id. at 483 n.10.
94 Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2539.
95 Id. at 2540.
96 United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738, 751 (2005).
97 Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2540.
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do affect sentencing and may cause a judge to impose a sentence
greater than the one he would impose based on the facts found by the
jury alone. There is no easy-way to avoid Blakely's constitutional re-
quirements, and a simple indeterminate sentencing scheme is no
exception.
Those who would argue that indeterminate sentencing passes the
Blakely test rely, first, on the distinction between "essential" and
"nonessential" facts. Justice Scalia writes those facts that are "legally
essential" must be found by ajury.98 He tries to distinguish indetermi-
nate sentencing by writing that, although indeterminate sentencing
does involve judicial factfinding, "the facts do not pertain to whether a
defendant has a legal right to a lesser sentence-and that makes all
the difference insofar as judicial impingement on the traditional role
of the jury is concerned."99 The argument is that some facts taken
into consideration by a judge-for example, offender characteris-
tics-do not change the circumstances of a crime. 10 0 If those factors
increase what a judge believes the sentence should be, it does not in-
fringe on the role of the jury, which exists to punish a defendant for a
crime as Congress chooses to define it. Determinate sentencing la-
bels, in effect, create new crimes, which is what infringes on the jury's
power.101
As a second argument, supporters refer to the pre-guidelinejuris-
prudence of Williams v. New York' 02 and United States v. Tucker.10 3 Wil-
liams held that there was no violation of the Constitution when ajudge
took into account information outside of the jury verdict.10 4 However,
the Williams case involved the death penalty, allowing a judge to over-
rule a jury decision of life imprisonment and impose the death sen-
tence. In the light of the Court's decision in Ring v. Arizona,10 5 any
reference to Williams is very weak. Tucker allows the judge to conduct
a broad inquiry into a defendant's history. However, it relies on lan-
guage that has come into question with Blakely. So long as the sen-
tence is within the statutory range, the decision states, the judge may
consider anything he wishes. 10 6 But if the statutory range is the sen-
98 Id. at 2543.
99 Id.
100 Note, supra note 11, at 1247-48.
101 Id. at 1253.
102 337 U.S. 241 (1949).
103 404 U.S. 443 (1972).
104 337 U.S. at 252.
105 536 U.S. 584 (2002) (holding that the Sixth Amendment requires any aggravat-
ing factors necessary for the imposition of the death penalty to be found by a jury).
106 Tucker, 404 U.S. at 446-47.
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tence the judge may impose without the finding of any additional
facts, 10 7 how much discretion does the judge really have?
Legally, both of these arguments fail. The mere existence of Ap-
prendi and its progeny undermine any real argument based on Wil-
liams and Tucker. The more difficult argument is the argument based
on essential and nonessential facts. Williams itself contradicts this dis-
tinction between legally essential facts that must be found by the jury
and nonessential facts that can be found by a judge during sentenc-
ing. The Williams Court wrote that information regarding the defen-
dant's life and character (offense and offender characteristics) was
not only relevant, but possibly essential to the determination of an
appropriate sentence. 10 8 Where, then, does one draw the line? The
indistinct "line" between essential and nonessential facts cannot be
drawn without leading judges toward a slippery slope. Restated, the
problem is not that the line cannot be drawn, but that, in fact, there is
no line between essential and nonessential elements. It is the prov-
ince of the jury to find facts, any facts, that may affect a defendant's
sentence. It is the judge's province to look at those facts and impose a
proper sentence. Despite the Supreme Court's defense of indetermi-
nate schemes, there is tension between Blakely and indeterminate
schemes.
Speaking in terms of policy, a return to indeterminate sentencing
is simply a bad idea. Problems with indeterminate sentencing were
the reason the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and its corrollaries in
the states came into existence in the first place. The indeterminate
schemes had become vehicles for disparity,10 9 permitting "the whims,
personal philosophies and biases" of judges, rather than the actual
nature of the offense, to serve as the basis for sentencing.110 The
point of guideline sentencing was to sentence similarly situated de-
fendants similarly."11 And ironically, if legislatures are allowed to re-
turn to indeterminate sentencing regimes, judges will be able to look
at the same kind of information that was thrown out in Blakely.
112
107 Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 2537 (2004).
108 Williams, 337 U.S. at 247.
109 Blakely Hearing, supra note 54 (testimony of William Mercer).
110 Id. (testimony of Ronald Weich).
111 S. REP. No. 98-225, at 38 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3220, 3225.
112 United States v. Croxford, 324 F. Supp. 2d 1230, 1247 (D. Utah 2004).
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D. Jury Sentencing
Criminal juries both find facts and apply the law, 113 and in six
states, legislatures have put the jury to work on sentencing.' 1 4 All six
states keep the same jury for both trial and sentencing. 1 5 As the full
ramifications of Blakely and its progeny come to light, states may be
wise to take their cue from Virginia and Kentucky-two states that
have already adopted jury sentencing schemes.
Blakely, while possibly unfriendly to guideline sentencing and
even indeterminate sentencing, would not find itself in contention
with a system of jury sentencing. In fact, jury sentencing would re-
spond, at least academically, to each of the problems with sentencing
that Justice Scalia's majority opinion raises. The Sixth Amendment
reserves power to the jury.1 16 Regardless of any argument regarding
the more objective standards of a judge, the common law traditions
entrenched in the Sixth Amendment right to ajury trial do not allow
that contention. Facts are not better discovered by 'Judicial inquisi-
tion than by adversarial testing before a jury."'117 The Constitution
enshrines a strict division between the authority of the judge and the
authority of the jury. It is the jury's role to find the essential facts. 118
What Apprendi, and presumably Blakely, will do, Justice Scalia's opin-
ion argues, is to return some of that power, which has been eroding
away, back to the jury." 9 And sentencing juries do precisely this-
they take the factfinding power of a judge and return it to the jury
box.
1. Sentencing by Juries
Four states currently use bifurcated "sentencing juries." Of these
states, Kentucky's system has remained least affected by reforms in
guideline sentencing and remains truest to its original form at adop-
tion. 120 Kentucky's system has no guidelines in effect for judicial or
jury sentencing. The defendant must serve at least twenty percent of
the term before being eligible for parole-in some instances the de-
113 Barkow, supra note 51, at 35-36.
114 Arkansas, Kentucky, Missouri, Oklahoma, Texas and Virginia all use jury sen-
tencing of some variety. Nancy J. King, Felony Juy Sentencing in Practice: A Three-State
Study, 57 VAND. L. REV. 885, 886 (2004).
115 Id..
116 Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 2537 (2004).
117 Id. at 2543.
118 Id.
119 Id. at 2541-42 (citing Kansas's adoption of a bifurcated jury sentencing
scheme in response to Apprendi).
120 King, supra note 114, at 892-93.
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fendant must serve upwards of fifty percent before being eligible for
parole.1 21 After a defendant is convicted, at a separate sentencing
hearing the prosecution and the defense can present evidence regard-
ing the circumstances of the crime, the defendant's criminal history
and evidence that may suggest the jury should be lenient. The jury,
based on this information, chooses a sentence from within a broad
statutory range. 122
Virginia has retained jury sentencing for defendants who actually
go to trial, but has adopted judicial sentencing after a plea. While
judges are "encouraged" to follow sentencing guidelines that have
been adopted by the Virginia state legislature, Virginia juries are not
exposed to guidelines and may sentence anywhere within a broad stat-
utory range.1 23 Arkansas, which also has recommended guidelines for
judges but not for juries, allows defendants who have been found
guilty pursuant to a plea to request ajury for sentencing. 124
In addition to these states that use jury sentencing for all felonies,
federal and State courts have long used bifurcated juries in capital
cases and courts have approved of such sentencing schemes. As the
Seventh Circuit noted, "[t] here is no novelty in a separate jury trial
with regard to sentences,just as there is no novelty in a bifurcated jury
trial .... Separate hearings before a jury on the issue of sentence is
the norm in capital cases." 125 More important than the historical use
of such a system is its obvious compatibility with Blakely and the re-
quirements of the Constitution.126
The rules of evidence, however, suggest some serious procedural
problems with a bifurcated system. Questions involving factors-such
as previous conduct-might be outlawed by the statute of limitations.
For example, Federal Rule of Evidence 403 prohibits the introduction
of a defendant's prior bad acts unless they are directly related to an
element of the crime. Therefore, in a bifurcated case, that evidence
121 Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 439.340-3402 (Banks-Baldwin 2000); King, supra note
114, at 893.
122 King, supra note 114, at 892.
123 Id. at 893.
124 Id. at 893-94, 929-30.
125 United States v. Booker, 375 F.3d 508, 514 (7th Cir. 2004).
126 There are those who might argue who a separate sentencing jury could result
in double jeopardy-a second trial for the same crime. However, as all elements of
the offense should be tried in the original trial, a sentencing hearing would only raise
issues traditionally raised in guideline sentencing hearings. See United States v. Ame-
line, 376 F.3d 967, 984 (9th Cir. 2004); Booker, 375 F.3d at 514. As a note of caution, a
prosecutor who wants to include something in sentencing that might be related to
offense conduct, perhaps a racially biased motivation, may run into problems of
double jeopardy.
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could not be included in the original trial stage. The question re-
mains whether these rules should apply at a separate sentencing
hearing.
The real problem with a jury that determines a sentence, how-
ever, is inexperience. Judges, even new judges, have years of experi-
ence working with the justice system. A sentencing jury has one
experience with sentencing-jurors face one defendant who has been
convicted in one trial. They have no other defendants with whom to
compare the one that stands before them, removing the ability, at
least among themselves, to offer comparable sentences for compara-
ble defendants. In fact, several states' experiences with jury sentenc-
ing systems show that defendants often prefer judicial sentencing to
jury sentencing. 127 Juries who sentence defendants tend to impose
higher sentences than do judges in drug cases, but often impose sig-
nificantly lower sentences than those given in bench trials or in plea
bargains in nondrug felony cases.1 28
The problem, then, is two-fold: inability to compare and insuffi-
cient knowledge about sentencing. The first problem is clear. Ajury
has one experience with sentencing, not years of experience with vari-
ous defendants, experience that can temper at least some judges.129
While indeterminate sentencing may lead to serious disparity among
defendants sentenced by different judges within a district, at least
among the defendants sentenced by a single judge there is a higher
level of consistency than when each defendant faces a different sen-
tencingjury. Therefore, a defendant facing a sentencing jury has lit-
tle indication of what his sentence will be. While television often
depicts defendants as eager to "see what ajury has to say about this,"
actual jury sentencing is so unpredictable, and often so severe, that
defendants would rather accept prosecutorial deal than take their
chances in front of a jury.130 And while judges in all the states that
employ this kind of system have the ability to reduce a defendant's
jury-imposed sentence, most judges, elected by the populace, choose
not to do sO.' 3 '
127 See, e.g., King, supra note 114, at 927-28 (showing that sentences imposed by
juries in Arkansas are generally longer than sentences imposed by judges who can be
guided by a voluntary range).
128 Id. at 931.
129 In Arkansas, at least, defendants who have pled face a sentencing jury that is
empanelled for approximately six months at a time. Id. at 932. However, in most
felony cases where a defendant faces the same jury at sentencing as he did at trial, he
will not face a jury that is even seasoned by six months of experience.
130 Id. at 910.
131 Id. at 933.
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The second problem is a direct result of the first. Because a jury
has not had extensive experience with sentencing, and because what
can be used to inform it is limited by statute, most juries are ignorant
of alternatives to a specific term of imprisonment. In Virginia, for
example, sentencing juries are not given information on the recom-
mended guideline range-which is often lower than the jury sen-
tence-or the effect of probation. 13 2 The alternatives are far fewer for
a sentencing jury than a judge or a prosecutor seeking a plea agree-
ment. This ignorance of options leads to disparity among defendants
as well as limited availability of restorative or rehabilitative alternatives
to prison.
Although a sentencing jury would meet the standards of Blakely, it
does little to address the problems Congress sought to correct when it
passed the sentencing guidelines. With juries determining the length
of sentences, the problems of disparity between similarly situated de-
fendants are likely to be perpetuated, not abated.
2. Jury Factfinding for Judicial Sentencing
It is possible for the jury to find facts necessary for sentencing
while the judge retains the right to use or not use those facts when
determining a sentence. Defendants in Kansas face this kind of a sys-
tem. Wary of the implications of Apprendi, the Kansas state legislature
codified the Court's dictates.133 Kansas statutes section 214716 re-
quires a judge to impose the presumptive sentence laid out by the
state's guideline system unless he finds a compelling reason for a
downward departure.1 34 Should the prosecution seek an upward de-
parture, the sentencing scheme requires: "Subject to the provisions of
subsection (b) of K.S.A. 21-4718, and amendments thereto, any fact
that would increase the penalty for a crime beyond the statutory maxi-
mum, other than a prior conviction, shall be submitted to a jury and
proved beyond a reasonable doubt."1 35
Upon motion by the prosecution, the statute requires the judge
to determine whether the factor affecting sentencing will be deter-
mined at trial or following the decision of the defendant's innocence
or guilt.1 36 If the court finds that it is "in the interest ofjustice," it can
order a separate sentencing hearing to determine the facts of the up-
132 VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-298.01(A) (Lexis 2004).
133 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4718 (Supp. 2003).
134 Id. § 21-4716(a).
135 Id. § 21-4716(b). The language derives directly from Apprendi. See Apprendi v.
New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000).
136 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4718(b)(2).
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ward departure.1 37 The jury at any sentencing hearing remains the
same as that which served during the trial phase.138 Once the jury has
unanimously found the sentencing factor beyond a reasonable doubt,
the judge may grant the upward departure. 39 Once the jury has rec-
ommended that a particular sentencing factor be taken into consider-
ation, the judge is under no obligation to do so. The jury finds the
facts but the judge imposes the sentence.
The very language of the Kansas statute highlights its unique abil-
ity among states to pass muster under Blakely.1 40 Because it uses the
language of Apprendi that "any fact that would increase the penalty for
a crime beyond the statutory maximum, other than a prior conviction,
shall be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable
doubt,"141 it was unaffected by Blakely. Such a system, if adopted by
other states or the federal government, would not face the constitu-
tional issue raised by guideline systems.
The benefit of a system such as this is that it can be modified in
such a way that does not infringe on judicial discretion.' 42 The jury's
role remains to find the facts. It is not necessary that the judge actu-
ally use that fact and apply it to sentencing. 143 The problems that
137 Id. § 214718(b) (4).
138 Id. The statute provides:
If any person who served on the trial jury is unable to serve on the jury for
the upward durational departure sentence proceeding, the court shall sub-
stitute an alternate juror who has been impaneled for the trialjury. If there
are insufficient alternate jurors to replace trial jurors who are unable to
serve at the upward durational departure sentence proceeding, the court
may conduct such upward durational departure sentence proceeding before
a jury which may have 12 or less jurors, but at no time less than six jurors.
Any decision of an upward durational departure sentence proceeding shall
be decided by a unanimous decision of the jury.
Id.
139 Id. § 214718(b) (7).
140 Randall L. Hodgkinson, A Blakely Primer: The Kansas Sentencing Guidelines,
CHAMPION, Aug. 2004, at 20.
141 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4716(b).
142 Any system that does not infringe on judicial discretion is one that is more
likely to be welcomed by seasoned federal judges who were less than happy when the
sentencing guidelines went into effect.
143 See Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 612-13 (2002) (Scalia, J., concurring).
What today's decision says is that the jury must find the existence of the fact
that an aggravating factor existed. Those States that leave the ultimate life-
or-death decision to the judge may continue to do so-by requiring a prior
jury finding of an aggravating factor in the sentencing phase or, more sim-
ply, by placing the aggravating-factor determination (where it logically be-
longs anyway) in the guilt phase.
Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
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come with jury sentencing-inexperience and ignorance of options-
do not result in a real offense system with jury factfinding. The jury
finds the facts but the judge actually applies those facts to the sen-
tence. Therefore, the jury reserves its right to determine the facts, but
the judge can use experience to determine an appropriate punish-
ment based on those facts.
Additionally, this kind of a system would heighten notice to the
defendant. Because the prosecutor would be required in some way-
whether in indictment or by another means 1 44-to notify the defen-
dant about what charges and facts will actually be alleged, the defen-
dant finds himself in a better position when making decisions about
trial. This kind of early warning about sentencing factors would in-
crease a defendant's knowledge of the actual charges he faces and
provide him with better tools during the plea bargaining process.
145
There are those who would argue that a system of additional
charged facts would increase prosecutorial power, providing more
facts with which to bargain. However, prosecutorial power already ex-
ists with regard to sentencing factors-including the substantial assis-
tance departure in the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. The benefit to
a defendant of a real offense system is that if he refuses to stipulate to
certain facts, it is less likely that ajury of twelve will find that fact be-
yond a reasonable doubt than that a judge will find that fact by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence. 146 The offense conduct itself will not be
a serious additional burden. 1
47
There are, however, evidentiary problems that would accompany
this kind of a system. Ajury that is required to find all facts relevant to
sentencing may be called on to determine facts that may be prejudi-
cial to a defendant. 148 Most of the facts that have traditionally been
144 The Kansas system requires a motion filed thirty days before the proceeding.
See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4718.
145 Note, supra note 11, at 1258.
146 See Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 2541-42 (2004) (discussing that any
change in bargaining power that would result from replacing a guideline system with
a real offense system would benefit the defendant).
147 A large amount of the offense conduct is already included in the prosecution
of the underlying offense, so to simply require a special jury verdict form with find-
ings of fact would not be entirely problematic. Blakely Hearing, supra note 54 (testi-
mony of Alan Vinegrad).
148 Although both Blakely and Apprendi set aside a special category for prior con-
victions, the fifth member of the majority in Almanderez-Torres, Justice Thomas, subse-
quently determined that case was wrongly decided. Prosecutors may soon find that
the jury will have to determine, beyond a reasonable doubt, the existence of prior
convictions. This kind of evidence of prior bad acts is, as demonstrated by Federal
Rules of Evidence 403 and 404, prejudicial.
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included in sentencing would be eliminated as either prejudicial or
irrelevant in the trial phase. 149 A possible response is to institute a
system similar to Kansas's, where the judge determines whether the
facts be determined at trial or in a post-trial sentencing proceeding.
In that way, there is the possibility both of limiting the amount of
money spent simply by using a special verdict form at trial and the
possibility of introducing evidence to the jury that would be prejudi-
cial at trial.
The real problems with any kind of jury sentencing system lie in
the practical and economic realities of requiring a jury to find all facts
relevant to sentencing. There are distinct difficulties in (1) in-
structing the jury and (2) having the jury come to unanimous agree-
ment on each and every fact necessary to determine sentencing. 150 It
is often difficult enough to get ajury to agree on a verdict, "let alone
the Herculean task of getting them to unite behind each factual find-
ing relevant to the sentencing.' ' 5 1 It will be, practically speaking, im-
possible to get a jury to unite behind every finding of fact that a
prosecutor would like to include in a sentence. 152 But these practical
technicalities may not be sufficient to overrule the good done by this
kind of system. A more limited number of sentencing factors, prop-
erly found by an empanelledjury of twelve, may give a more accurate
sentence and reduce the disparities that still exist in states and the
federal system using guideline systems.
The more pressing issue is economic expense. Requiring juries
to find all sentencing factors would obviously increase the amount of
time that a jury would remain empanelled, increasing the expense of
149 See United States v. Ameline, 376 F.3d 967, 983 n.20 (9th Cir. 2004) (sug-
gesting that a court "may elect to give the jury a special verdict form if the introduc-
tion of evidence related to sentencing is not excluded as unduly prejudicial or
irrelevant"). Language similar to this in Ameline suggests an openness to a real of-
fense system, but a brief look at the rules of evidence suggests that a significant num-
ber of sentencing factors would be excluded as prejudicial or irrelevant. See FED. R.
EVID. 403.
150 I think it is clear that a real offense system could not take into consideration
the number of factors included in systems such as the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.
"While juries generally are adept at determining the guilt or innocence of a defen-
dant, the list of findings contemplated by the Guidelines is extensive and nuanced,
modified and interpreted regularly in numerous court opinions. Making such find-
ings is a task much assigned to judges, notjuries." United States v. Croxford, 324 F.
Supp. 2d 1230, 1242 (D. Utah 2004).
151 Id. at 1244.
152 Aweline, 376 F.3d at 982 (citing the government's brief, which argued that "it
would likely be impossible, as a practical matter, to charge and prove to ajury beyond
a reasonable doubt all enhancing factors in all cases").
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reimbursing them for their time and removing possible jurors from
their jobs longer than is currently necessary in most states. However,
states such as Kansas-which use this real offense system-and states
such as Virginia-which have sentencing juries-manage the expense
without serious problem. In addition, a defendant can always waive
the right to have the jury determine the necessary facts. Well-crafted
plea bargains can save both the defendant and the prosecution the
time and money associated with jury factfinding for judicial sentenc-
ing. But the simplest response to the economic analysis is simply that
additional spending is a small price to pay for the proper implementa-
tion of justice.
In summary, both kinds of jury sentencing would pass muster
under Blakely, but both suffer from serious problems of judicial econ-
omy and economic efficiency. Although either would retain the jury
as factfinder, the increase in time commitment and commitment of
economic resources may be impractical. An actual sentencing jury,
with its requirements that a twelve-person panel with no experience
with the complexities of sentencing choose the sentence, will result in
pre-guideline problems of disparity and lack of notice. However, a
system that allows a jury to find the facts and a judge to apply those
facts at sentencing may be the best option.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the most constitutionally firm option is for states
and the federal government to create a bifurcated, real offense system
that requires juries to find the facts and allows the judge discretion in
applying those facts. This kind of a system meets the strictures of
Blakely and avoids the tension that resides even in a return to an inde-
terminate sentencing scheme. However, based on the Supreme
Court's language and its suggested severance of the mandatory nature
of the federal guidelines, this option may be rejected by legislatures.
In the end, it is likely that the advisory guidelines suggested by Justice
Breyer will remain just that-a suggestion. What has resulted, then, is
a return to where Congress started twenty years ago-indeterminate
sentencing. The twenty-year experiment of guideline sentencing has
finally failed. What remains is a number of questions that will be the
topic of legal and political argument for years to come.
In trying to highlight the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial,
did the Supreme Court go too far? Do the Sixth Amendment and the
Due Process Clause really require such an extreme result, or did the
Supreme Court start down a road that led to an undesired destina-
tion? Is there no option left to courts but to turn to the long, compli-
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cated process of sentencing juries? And if indeterminate sentencing
schemes really do fail under Blakely because a jury must find all facts
relevant to sentencing, then how many defendants have been unjustly
sentenced in the existence of the American judicial system?
